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The Sneaker Showdown:
Athletic Shoe Companies Battle for Market Share
Wendi Hess and Jane Messingharn

A war continues in the United States, although there has been no official
declaration. The battleground is the consumer's mind. Every day American
citizens are bombarded with the artillery, although they may not recognize
it. Employing the media and celebrities, the attacking forces fight intense
campaigns. The combatants are athletic shoe companies, and Nike and
Reebok are the two dominant battling forces.
ADIDAS: THE BATTLE BEGINS

In the athletic shoe industry, the founder of the athletic shoe is not the current market leader, Nike, nor is it second ranked Reebok. The innovator in
athletic shoes was Adidas. Production of Adidas athletic shoes began after
World War I. A brief survey of Adidas' history helps one understand the
current battle between Nike and Reebok.
Adidas' first breakthrough in the athletic shoe business occurred in
1936. American track star Jesse Owens wore Adidas in the Olympics. He
won his medals in front of the world, thus revealing the product to consumers worldwide. This event thrust Adidas into the running-shoe market
and prompted development of new and better products.
Adidas has always tinkered with new shoe developments, from improved
metal spikes to fashionable trends in style designs. As the decades unfolded,
Adidas continued to diversify into footwear for other sporting events, into
sports bags, and into swimwear and other sports apparel. Adidas set the
stage for many industry practices still maintained today. The primary practice, still important in the 1990s, is use of a celebrity or famous athlete for
endorsement purposes. This marketing tactic is widely used by Nike and
Reebok. In fact, an industry average is to use about 80 percent of the advertising budget for endorsements. The remaining 20 percent goes to media
advertising (Hartley, 1989). Another Adidas practice still common today is
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use of international athletes for testing purposes. The athletes use the
products in real situations and offer feedback to the companies. Necessary
improvements in design and technology can then be made, thus improving
product performance.
Adidas continued to dominate sporting showcase events through 1972,
when Nike shoes entered the market. Adidas still dominates many foreign markets, although Nike and Reebok are penetrating overseas markets as well.
WAFFLE IRON INNOVATIONS

In 1964, Phil Knight showed samples of Tiger Athletic shoes to his former
track coach, Bill Bowerman, of the University of Oregon. Bowerman had
always experimented with running-shoes, attempting to make them lighter.
Knight and Bowerman went into business together, selling Tiger shoes to
athletic teams. Soon they developed their own shoe and in 1971 began marketing Nike shoes, named after the Greek goddess of victory. They also
developed the "swoosh" logo, to be placed on every Nike product from that
point on .
In the shadow of Adidas, Nike made a slow start. In 1975, however, Bowerman developed a major breakthrough. Experimenting with a waffle iron
and urethane rubber, he developed the waffle sole . This sole became popular with runners, and Nike moved ahead of Adidas within a few years. It
continues to grow. Nike wisely made a commitment to research and development of new designs for different foot types, skills, and sexes. In 1979,
the air chamber was born, another innovative idea Nike still uses today.
In the beginning, Nike received advance orders for its products which
often took as long as six months to fill. This gave Nike an advantage. It was
able to plan production schedules and inventory costs. In 1979, Nike was a
$14 million company with a 33 percent market share in the United States.
In 1982, it was a $694 million company with a 50 percent market share
(Hartley, 1989). In 1983, the running boom matured and no longer offered
substantial growth. Nike responded by moving into children's shoes, apparel, athletic bags, and other line extensions.
THE BRITISH ARE COMING

Reebok's ancestor company began in England in the late 1890s when
Joseph William Foster made the first running shoes with spikes. By 1895, he
was making shoes by hand for top runners. In 1958, the founder's grandsons started a companion company. This company became known as
Reebok.
Reebok was virtually unknown to the United States until 1979 when it
introduced the first aerobic shoe, the Freestyle . This shoe arrived at a most
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opportune time. Aerobics was becoming a popular form of exercise, and
more women than ever before were taking part in athletic activities. The
aerobic shoe was appealing because it was sleek and attractive and didn't
look like a man's shoe. Since then, Reebok has experienced explosive
growth and continues to develop performance technologies to improve its
products.
RIDING THE MARKET SHARE ROLLER COASTER

In the recent past, Nike and Reebok have experienced a roller coaster ride
of market leadership in the United States. Nike captured the leadership
position when the introduction of the waffle sole in 1975 enabled it to capitalize effectively on the running boom (Hartley, 1989). In the 1980s, Nike
tried to broaden its horizons by "slapping the Nike name on a line of casual
shoes" (Meeks, 1990, p. 107). Unfortunately, it missed the big trend toward
aerobic shoes while concentrating on other line extensions. Reebok capitalized on the aerobics wave, and Nike lost the leadership position to Reebok
in 1986. In losing its technology focus and emphasizing fashion instead,
Nike failed to understand new trends once the running boom had slowed
down (Yang, 1990). However, once on top, Reebok could not hang on to its
position for long either. Without a.,clear approach to maintaining market
share, it lost the leadership position to Nike in 1989. Nike captured the
number one position with its 1989 'Just Do It" campaign. Nike's market
share continued to increase as Reebok's became smaller. In 1991, Nike
owned 30 percent 'Of the athletic shoe market and Reebok, 24 percent. The
remaining 46 percent was held by numerous companies, none with more
than 12 percent of the market.
THE BATTLEFRONT

Nike and Reebok both seem to aim at the same target market, teenagers
and ethnic minorities (Sloan, 1989), although Nike maintains it does not
market its products by race. It is only a "coincidence" that athletes hired are
black . The black athletes, Nike insists, have tremendous "crossover appeal"
(Freeman, 1991). By using athletes in their advertising, both companies are
attempting to capture athletes' purchases as well as sales to those who want
to emulate athletes. Sixty percent of those who buy Nike shoes, for example, are not hard-core athletes (Willigan, 1992). Indeed, only about 10
percent of the people who wear sneakers buy them for the sport for which
they were designed (Meeks, 1990). That leaves 90 percent of athletic shoe
wearers purchasing an athletic shoe for comfort and fashion.
Reebok and Nike target women and men in separate advertising spots.
Both companies also target teenagers . It can be deduced, therefore, that
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both companies have probably fallen into the "everybody trap "-that of
attempting to appeal to all segments of the market.
THE "AIR" ATTACK : PLACING TECHNOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE AT
THE FRONT

During Nike's early beginnings in the 1970s, it faced fierce competition
from Adidas. Realizing its product was inferior to the leader's, Nike knew it
needed a better product to capture a significant share of the market. Once
produced and marketed, the waffle sole was just the impetus Nike needed.
Nike has always maintained, with the exception of a few disastrous years in
the l 980's, that technology and performance have been its primary tactics
in producing and marketing its line of shoes (Yang, 1990) .
Late in the year 1978, Nike put its first "Air" shoe on the market-again,
a technological advancement. Nike conducted extensive research to understand the concept of decreased energy expenditure through use of a
shock-absorbing air bag. In advertising its innovation, Nike never showed
the product itself; only the concept was revealed to the eager consumers.
Demand for the "Air Tailwind" was fantastic. Nike continued to improve the
shoe's "Air" design and, the "Air" system remains a crucial construction feature of nearly all Nike shoes today (Becklund/Strasser, 1991) .
As noted earlier, Nike lost its focus in the 1980s when it ignored the aerobic craze and tried to diversify into casual shoes. Nike was then slapped
with Reebok's market share gain. Nike fought back by reverting its focus
from fashion to technology. Nike introduced its visible "Air" shoes in 1987.
It cut out a portion of the rubber in the sole , allowing the air bag to be
seen. Nike also increased endorsements to place this new product in consumers' minds. The visible "Air" remains a fashion feature today, yet its
roots lie in the technological advancement of the sole (Becklund/Strasser,
1991).
JUST DO IT

Nike fought hard to recapture the leadership position. It launched advertising campaigns to promote its visible "Air" shoes as well as other new lines.
'Just Do It" became a popular battle cry throughout the nation. This catchy,
no-excuses slogan was used in advertising and printed on Nike apparel.
'Just Do It" crystallized Nike's reemerging philosophy.
Nike's primary tactic to generate sales, however, remains use of high
profile celebrity endorsements. The celebrities are hired to wear Nike
products and appear at promotional activities. The majority of these
endorsements are by well-known athletes; indeed Nike's most popular
endorsements are by black athletes (Freeman, 1991).
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To help consumers tie athletes and products together, Nike names some
of its products after the athlete used to promote the product. One of Nike's
best known endorsers has been basketball superstar Michael Jordan.Jordan
has been with Nike since 1984 and the "Air Jordan" is one of Nike's most
popular products, for it ties Jordan's uncanny leaping and "hang time" gifts
to his "Air Jordan" shoes (Becklund/Strasser, 1991). The "Air Jordan"
undergoes modifications in design and technology with each season.
In addition to Jordan, football and baseball star Bo Jackson and his distinctive "Bo Knows" commercials tie a cross training shoe with a cross
training athlete. Nike has effectively used Jackson's dual athletic abilities to
demonstrate to consumers that cross training shoes can be used for multiple purposes. Nike's top-of-the-line cross trainer is often called the "Bo
Jackson" shoe. These are just two of several athletic endorsers Nike has
employed.
Film director and actor Spike Lee has added a new twist to Nike's promotional activities. Lee is featured in a paid public service announcement
concerning race relations, sponsored by Nike, as well as in regular advertisements. Nike knows such announcements will guarantee press coverage
(free advertising) for Nike. Lee also connects Nike with the urban market,
where Nike does most of its business . "Lee will keep Nike aware of what's
going on in major markets, like New York," says Scott Bed bury, Nike's director of advertising (Magiera, 1992). Thus Nike appears to be employing Lee,
not only as a promotional tool, but also to keep tabs on the black marketplace. Opportunities and threats in the market environment can therefore
be more closely monitored.
SUPERSTORE TO THE BATTLEGROUND

Nike's latest tactic in the shoe war is its new superstores called Nike Towns.
Nike's first Nike Town, in Portland, Oregon, was 20,000 square feet of retail
space designed to resemble a movie set. Nike Towns house every product in
Nike's line, each in its respective setting. The superstores have different
"shops" for swim gear, tennis gear, basketball, etc. Each shop has a different
temperature setting, lighting, and sound system. According to the store's
designer, Gordan Thompson, the environment "stimulates people, keeps
them interested, and moving" (Hannon, 1991, p. 159).
Nike Towns also offer first-rate service from extensively trained athletes.
No pressure to buy comes from the sales staff and discounts arc never used.
The stores are used as promotional vehicles to stimulate customers. Their
main purpose is to dazzle people into buying Nike products-wherever they
choose to buy them. If a Nike product is purchased, Nike makes a profit. It
doesn ' t matter where the product is purchased . A second store opened in
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Chicago in 1992 and others have been added in major cities.
P U M P I N G U P T H-E TR O O P S- " U . B . U . " TA K ES TO T H E F I EL D

In 1987-1988, when Nike introduced its new "Air" campaign, Reebok found
itself in a slump. Its aerobic shoes could no longer carry the bulk of its business, and its tennis shoe was only three years old. Reebok was also working
on a new pump system, but it wouldn't be out for at least another year.
Reebok needed to do something to keep its name in the consumer's mind
until it could come up with a product people wanted to buy
(Becklund/Strasser, 1991). Its solution was an advertising campaign that
didn't show the product at all. It emphasized lifestyle over function;
"U .B.U." was the new campaign. It bought Reebok the time it needed to
develop a new product.
PUMPING IT UP

In November 1989, Reebok introduced a shoe that would put it back in the
running for market share. This ingenious athletic shoe featured an air bladder that, when inflated, molds the shoe to the wearer's foot. More than four
million pairs of these shoes walked, ran, jumped, or sprinted out of stores
between November 1989 and August 1991 (Wiesendanger, 1991). The
"Pump," as it was called, was promoted by celebrity athletes. The entire
Cincinnati Bengals football team, basketball star Dominique Wilkins, golfer
Greg Norman, and tennis great Michael Chang were all put on the Reebok
roster. Reebok thought that by using athletes, it would establish in the consumer's mind that the "Pump" is all about performance (Wiesendanger,
1991). The company also set up booths in malls allowing people to try on
the new "Pump" shoes. Consumers had an opportunity to learn firsthand
about the "Pump," and Reebok had an opportunity to learn from consumers' feedback. In 1991, Reebok had 36 styles of the "Pump" shoe in nine
sport categories (Wiesendanger, 1991).
SINBAD'S SHOE

Reebok's next new offering came in 1991. It introduced the "Blacktop"
shoe-the first shoe especially made for outdoor court play. Made of heavy
leather and a tough sole, it can withstand the abuse of America's city
streets. To promote this shoe, Reebok sponsored nationwide three-on-three
basketball tournaments and spent $6.5 million on advertising (Hammonds,
1991). Rather than spotlight a professional athlete, the campaign stars Sinbad, a popular black comedian. As of August 1991, Reebok revenues were
up 10 percent, while Nike's were down 6 percent (Hammonds, 1991). Not
only does the "Blacktop" perform well, but it also looks good. It appeals to
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the 90 percent of consumers who buy athletic shoes for comfort or fashion
(Hammonds, 1991). Most important is the fact that n o one else had ever hit
upon the notion of selling a shoe specifically for outdoor play.
DAN AND DAVE AT THE FRONT

Sometimes, however, the best marketing plans go awry. In 1992 Reebok
recruited two Olympic decathlon contenders: Dan O'Brien and Dave Johnson. Advertisements featuring Dan and Dave were simple: fifteen seconds of
baby pictures of the two, a promotion for the 1992 summer Olympics, and
the Reebok logo. Advertisements followed with the two in later years and
finally as adults. These ads were simple, similar to home movies, and were
promotions to which consumers could relate. The campaign was all ready to
be launched when, to the dismay of Reebok's executives, Dan O'Brien
failed to qualify for the 1992 Olympics. Reebok continued to air commercials with the two athletes; however, spots showing O'Brien congratulating
Johnson now promoted the new running shoe. In this way Reebok attempted to turn a negative situation into a strength.
DEFENSIVE STRATEGY: NIKE

What does the future hold in the athletic shoe war? As market leader, Nike
should maintain the defensive strategy. Nike must make moves to attack
itself. Nike needs to continue to change and update its product line. Deve loping new styles of shoes and phasing out outdated designs would be a
smart maneuver. However, Nike's product line has continued to grow; it has
many styles very similar to each other. This tactic serves only to cloud the
consumer's mind . In our communication-intensive society, Nike must narrow its product line. Consumers are confused by a multitude of choices.
Nike has become in shoes what General Motors is in cars: weakened by line
extensions.
Nike should also block competitive moves, employing the defensive
strategy. In the 1980s, Reebok identified a need in the market and introduced aerobic shoes. Nike should have counter-attacked immediately by
introducing its own aerobic shoe. Market leadership would have given Nike
a competitive advantage over Reebok's shoe. The Nike name would have
captured a portion of the market. If Nike would have blocked Reebok's
competitive move, it may not have lost the leadership position in the 1980s.
As the market share leader, Nike should also enhance the entire athletic
shoe category. By enhancing the arena Nike will benefit, for enlarging the
market for athletic shoes will, in turn, enlarge Nike's sales volume. A consumer's mind is virtually impossible to change . Nike will be spinning its
whe els if it tries to convince competitors' customers to switch brands. This
12
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would represent a waste of advertising dollars. Nike could go forward, however, by turning consumers on to athletic shoes in general. Enlarging the
entire product pie will make everybody's piece larger.
OFFENSIVE STRATEGY: REEBOK

Currently in second place in market share, Reebok should assume an offensive strategy to marketing warfare. Reebok needs to focus upon the strength
of Nike's position. This means realizing that Nike dominates basketball and
cross training shoes. Therefore Reebok should phase out those lines unless
it can come up with a unique advantage. Nike must fail in a category for
Reebok to succeed.
Thus, focusing on the enemy (Nike), instead of upon itself would be
Reebok 's smartest move . Rather than trying to determine how to increase
its own share, Reebok should look at how it can decrease the shares of
opponents-by going to consumers' minds. Ries and Trout repeatedly
remind companies that "Marketing warfare is a mental exercise with the
battleground being the human mind" ( 1986, p. 70).
Finding a weakness in the leader's strength and attacking that weakness
is the key principle to follow. Nike's strengths may very well be its celebrity
endorsers and the fact that it has been in the marketplace for a considerable length of time. A weakness in these strengths may be that although
Nike uses celebrities such as Michael Jordan, it has been using his name on
shoes continuously. Each year a new 'Jordan" shoe is unveiled, relatively
unchanged. Rather than the shoe being a technological innovation, it is
merely a new color or minor improvement over the previous season's shoe.
Reebok could exploit this reality by pushing the message that it is the "true
innovator" in shoe technology.
Launching the attack on as narrow a front as possible is the other basic
rule of war Reebok should activate. Ries and Trout state that, "A full line is
a luxury only leaders can afford" (1986, p . 72). It is difficult to say that
Reebok should cut its lines. The difference in market share between numbers one and two barely gives us a distinct leader. Reebok should, however,
stick with what it does best and drop the lines that Nike dominates.
GUERILLA STRATEGY-ADIDAS

Adidas is a dominant competitor in overseas athletic shoe markets. It leads
in market share in many countries. In the United States, however, Adidas
only owns a small portion of the market. It is one of the 94 of 100 firms that
should pursue guerilla warfare. Adidas must find a segment of the market
small enough to defend, a niche that the market leaders will not bother to
enter. Adidas already has an image in many U .S. consumers' minds, that of
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court shoe strength. Rather than attempting to change the consumer's
mind, Adidas should capitalize on this image. In other words, Adidas
should stick to the niche it already holds. Though Nike and Reebok make
court shoes, their efforts to dominate the niche have not been successful. If
Adidas sticks with its court shoes and does not try to diversify, it can defend
its niche .
Fo11owing the gueri11a strategy, Adidas should never act like a leader. No
matter how successful it becomes, Adidas should stick to a narrowly defined
market line. A wide front is something only a leader can maintain . Adidas
must be the specialist. Adidas must also be prepared to "bug out" at a
moment's notice (Ries and Trout, 1986, p. l 07). If sales start to fal1, Adidas
needs to abandon its niche. Adidas therefore must maintain flexibility in
order to react to market changes. If Adidas does not monitor the market, it
could perish in the United States. However, as Ries and Trout assure us, "A
company that runs away lives again to fight another day" (1986, p . 107).
CONCLUSION

The marketplace environment produced by the athletic shoe companies is
analogous to a war zone . Nike and Reebok are presently engaged in war.
Battles have been won and lost on both sides. Each company has enjoyed
the reign of leader. Though Nike is currently leading the industry in market share, Reebok should be considered a threat. Each company enjoys
product leadership in certain categories within the market. Nike owns
cross-training for men, men's basketbal1, and the running shoe categories .
Reebok, however, controls the women's market clue to its control of the aerobic shoe. Reebok's styles tend to have more feminine appeal than Nike's.
With the exception of the slight lapse in the micl-l 980s, Nike has been
successful in choosing a tactic and sticking with it. Reebok, too, should
identify a tactic that it can use to its advantage rather than confuse consumers by continually changing its products. This is no typical war, for it is
taking place in all of our minds. For athletic shoe companies to survive the
battle, they must occupy the unique territory of the mind .
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